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the future ;143 and in Uy v. Shapmor, Inc.,'" the appellate term
stated: "were this an automobile accident case.. . [the inadvertent
mention of insurance would not have been a ground for declaring a
mistrial] because it is generally known by the public today that
New York State has provided for compulsory liability insurance
of automobiles.' 14
5
While the deliberate disclosure of the presence of a liability
insurer is still a ground for declaring a mistrial, the Halstead
decision has effectuated the liberal policy of the CPLR by ignoring
inadvertent, non-prejudicial disclosure.
ARTICLE 52-ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5201: Future income of a spendthrift trust held attachable.
In Cohen v. Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 46 the court held
that an attachment of the income of a spendthrift trust was effective,
to the extent of ten per cent, against both the accrued income and
future income of the trust. The Loeb company, defendant in the
case, had impleaded one Dolan based upon his contract of indemnity.
As third-party plaintiff, the Loeb company obtained an order
attaching Dolan's interest in a certain testamentary trust, the corpus
of which was located in New York. In holding the attachment
valid, the court cited Koch v. Burdsal 4 7 as authority for the
proposition that the attachment was effective against ten per cent
of the future income of the trust.
148
CPLR 6202 makes subject to attachment "any debt or property
against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided in
section 5201," which in turn essentially provides for execution
against any property which could be assigned or transferred.149
The apparent purpose of CPLR 6202 is to equate property subject
to execution with property subject to attachment and thereby to
eliminate the discrepancies which resulted from separate listings
143 SECOND RE,. 233. See also 4 WEiNsTmN, Kour & MmiLER, Nsw YoRa
Civn PRAcrxcF 14110.05 (1965).
144 45 Misc. 2d 543, 257 N.Y.S.2d 208 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1965).
1- Id. at 544, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 209; Hager v. Bushman, 255 App. Div. 934,
8 N.Y.S.2d 725 (4th Dep't 1938); cf. Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d
111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
14048 Misc. 2d 159, 162, 264 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1965).
147 199 Misc. 880, 104 N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y. City Ct 1951).
143 Cohen v. Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 48 Misc. 2d 159, 162, 264
N.Y.S2d 463, 466 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). See also note 158 infra for
a discussion of Koch.
149 See CPLR 5201(b). As to debts, as opposed to property, CPLR 5201(a)
permits enforcement of a money judgment against "any debt, which is past
due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment
debtor. .. '
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of each under the CPA.150 However, section 5201 is not the only
provision authoriing execution under the CPLR. CPLR 5231
provides for execution against ten per cent of the judgment debtor's
income in excess of thirty dollars per week. This provision applies
both to income from a trust and to iarnings of the judgment debtor
for his personal services, which, under CPLR 5205(e) (1) and (2)
are made applicable to the satisfaction of money judgments.
But here an apparent gap opens in the legislative policy to
equate attachment with execution by means of the broad test of
assignment. Earnings for personal services, which are assignable
up to ten per cent,151 are subject to attachment 52 to the extent of
ten per cent under Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Gunning.'5M
The future income of a spendthrift trust is not assignable"5 4 and,
it would seem to follow, not subject to attachment under CPLR 6202
and CPLR 5201. Under CPA § 916, which was in force when
Gunning held wages to be attachable, it was explicitly provided that
only the defendant's assignable interest in a trust was subject to
attachment. 55 Furthermore, the cases construing CPA § 916 ex-
pressly indicated that future income of a spendthrift trust could
not be attached. 56 There is no indication that the legislature
intended any substantive change in this area by enacting CPLR
6202.11 On the contrary, reading CPLR 6202 and CPLR 5201
together, the legislature appears to have continued to exempt non-
assignable future income of a spendthrift trust from attachment.
Therefore, it would appear that the court in Cohen was technically
in error when it interpreted CPLR 6202, 5201, and 5231 to allow
attachment of future spendthrift trust income. 58
150 See TIm REP. 149.
'5' N.Y. PErs. PROP. LAW § 48-a.
152 Subject to attachment-to be distinguished from their being subject to
execution in satisfaction of a judgment for which CPA § 684 explicitly
provided.
'53 295 N.Y. 324, 67 N.E.2d 510 (1946).
254 That is to say the right of the beneficiary of an express trust to receive
the rents and profits of real property or the income of personal property is
not assignable under N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 15 and N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 103.155 CPA §916 (6).
256 Judis v. Martin, 218 App. Div. 402, 407, 213 N.Y. Supp. 423, 427 (1st
Dep't 1926), appeal dismissed, 244' N.Y. 605, 155 N.E. 916 (1927); Pray v.
Boissevain, 27 Misc. 2d 703, 704, 212 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433-34 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1961) ; Harry Winston, Inc. v. Acheson, 144 N.Y.S2d 472, 475 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
157 See Tlmu RaP. 148-49.
158 Koch v. Burdsal, 199 Misc. 880, 104 N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y. City Ct. 1951),
which Cohen cited as authority for the attachability of future trust income,
appears to be doubtful precedent. There, the court allowed a quasi in rem
basis of jurisdiction to have an in personam effect. After the day of judg-
ment, the court in Koch held that the res of the trust, which had been
attached' for jurisdiction in the original action, could be executed against
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The real issue, however, is not whether the decision is technically
correct, but what are its practical consequences and whether it is
consistent with the overall legislative intent. Cohen certainly fulfills
the broad desire of the legislature to make uniform the property which
is subject to execution and which is attachable. This rule is highly
desirable where the attachment is the only basis of securing juris-
diction, i.e., the quasi in rem action, and where the attached property
will be the only means the successful plaintiff would have to satisfy
the judgment. It seems unfair to prevent a potential plaintiff,
with a valid cause of action against a beneficiary of a New York
trust, from initiating a quasi in rem action against the beneficiary.
In such a case, the res is the accumulated income of the trust.
The injustice becomes manifest when it is seen that CPLR 5231
permits execution against the same income. In addition, there
seems to be no practical reason to distinguish between ordinary
wages which are attachable despite their not being "certain" as is
required by CPLR 5201(a), and the income of a spendthrift trust
which is subject to execution by virtue of the same provision.
However, the practitioner must weigh these considerations against
the fact that a strict reading of the statute further forbids attachment
of non-assignable property. At least in instances where attachment
of property within the state is necessary for jurisdictional purposes,
it seems highly desirable that this legislative gap be bridged as was
accomplished by the court in Cohen.
Of further interest to the practitioner is the fact that Cohen
held that the service of the order of attachment made therein was
valid and proper under CPLR 6214. CPLR 6214(a) provides that
a levy of attachment shall be made by serving the proper garnishee
(the trustee in this case) with the order of attachment in the same
manner as a summons is served. In Cohen, the trust property was
located in New York and the law of New York was controlling
with respect to the administration of the trust; the trustee was served
with the order of attachment by registered mail and personally in
Florida; the depository of the trust fund (a New York trust com-
pany) was served in New York; and the beneficiary, Dolan, was
served by publication. Although CPLR 6214 does not specify
whether such trustee must be served within the state, when the
trust property itself is within the state, it seems, under fundamental
principles of jurisdiction, that the court has power over the property
provided that reasonable notice has been given to the interested
parties.3. 9
even as to future income accruing after date of final judgment. A true
quasi in rem action would appear to admit execution only on income accrued
up to the date of judgment.
169 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723, 727 (1878).
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CPLR 5201.: Fund beyond judgment creditor's execution.
In Valerio v. College Point Say. Bank,160 the judgment creditor
sought to levy on a fund composed of monthly payments made
by the judgment debtor as mortgagor to the mortgagee bank. These
payments, under the mortgage contract, were to be held in trust by
the bank to insure satisfaction of monthly tax and insurance obliga-
tions. Under this contract, the judgment debtor had no right to
any of the money paid while any part of the principal or interest
was owing to the bank. The court, in a rationale similar to that
used in construing the CPA counterparts of CPLR 5225(b) and
5227, held that the judgment creditor's rights in the fund could
be no greater than that of the judgment debtor."'- Thus, the
judgment creditor, when he seeks to levy on the property of the
judgment debtor in the hands of a third party, can only do so
subject to the terms of the contract. To be more precise, the
judgment creditor may execute on the property of the judgment
debtor in the possession of a third party by commencing a special
proceeding in which the judgment debtor has an interest,""2 or
where the third party is a "person who is or will become
indebted to the judgment debtor. . ,, .11
Prior commentary had noted the difficulty of drawing any
distinction between these two categories of third-party possessors.
Indeed, attorneys were advised to avoid the difficulty by proceeding
against third parties under both sections simultaneously. 64 The
Valerio decision does not attempt to clarify this problem. This is
an area of considerable importance to judgment creditors since,
under CPLR 5227, the court may require that payment be made
directly to the judgment creditor, whereas under CPLR 5225(b),
payment or delivery is to be made through a sheriff. Whenever a
sheriff must be employed as an intermediary, his fees will diminish
the recovery and his procedures will cause a certain delay. It is
important to note that the judgment creditor in Valerio followed
the advice of the commentary and employed both these sections.
Until a distinction is made between the two, the practitioner is
similarly advised to employ both 5225(b) and 5227 in this type
of proceeding.
168048 Misc. 2d 91, 264 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct Suffolk County 1965).
161 Compare id. at 92, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 344, with Slaff v. Slaff, 9 App. Div.
2d 80, 83, 191 N.Y.S.2d 636, 639 (1st Dep't 1959) and Central Suffolk Hosp.
Ass'n v. Downs, 213 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961). CPA§§ 794, 796 were formerly applicable.
162 CPLR 5225(b).
163 CPLR 5227.
'1 See 7B McINNEY's CPLR 5225, supp. commentary 26 (1965).
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